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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
KENNETH BEACH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20010445-CA 
Priority No. 2 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction1 for Attempted Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8 (2)(a)(i) (1998),2 in the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the 
Honorable David S. Young, presiding. 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE FIRST ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
AND PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: Did the police have reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Appellant Kenneth 
1
 A copy of the "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment," R. 43-45, is attached in Addendum 
A. 
2
 This statute was amended effective 1 May 2001. However, because the Information was 
issued previously, R. 7-8, the former version of the statute is cited. See State v. Redd, 1999 UT 
10814 n.2, 992 P.2d 986 ("[W]e apply the law as it existed at the time of the crime charged.") 
Beach ["Mr. Beach"] after Mr. Beach leaned into the passenger window of a car, 
exchanged something with someone inside, and met a police officer's gaze as the officer 
drove by? 
Standard of Review: "Although the trial judge is in the best position to determine the 
reasonableness of the [police officer's] conduct under the particular facts of each case,.. 
. we must correct errors in the application of the law to these facts." State v. Trujillo. 739 
P.2d 85, 86-87 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted). Thus, a trial court's ultimate 
determination about whether specific facts support a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity is "a determination of law and is reviewable nondeferentially for correctness... 
." State v. ContreL 886 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) cert, denied State v. ContreL 
899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995) (quoting State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994)). See 
also Salt Lake City v. Rav. 2000 Utah Ct. App. 55,18, 998 P.2d 274. 
Preservation: This argument is preserved at R. 23-25. 
STATEMENT OF THE SECOND ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: In light of the unlawful behavior of the police in stopping and detaining Mr. Beach 
without reasonable suspicion, was Mr. Beach's subsequent consent to a search of his 
person voluntarily given? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's factual findings are reviewed under the clearly 
erroneous standard, while the ultimate conclusion of whether consent was voluntary or 
2 
involuntary is reviewed for correctness. State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433,438 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996). 
Preservation: This argument is preserved at R. 23-25. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following provision from the United States Constitution is relevant on appeal. 
The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
The following statute is relevant on appeal. Utah Code Annotated section 77-7-15 
provides: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On 13 September 2000, Mr. Beach was charged by information with Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance. R. 7-8. He filed a Motion to Suppress evidence on 
3 
15 December 2000. R. 23-24. 
At the hearing on the Motion, the defense counsel argued that evidence of 
controlled substances found in Mr. Beach's possession should be suppressed because the 
police officer who discovered them did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Beach 
in the first place. R. 65 [31-33]. Additionally, even if the officer did have reasonable 
suspicion, Mr. Beach gave a truthful explanation for his activities and his explanation 
was corroborated by witnesses. R. 65 [33-34]. The officer did not have the right to 
question Mr. Beach further. R. 65 [36-37]. Notwithstanding, the officer continued 
questioning Mr. Beach for a total of twenty-two minutes and discovered nothing other 
than a couple of routine traffic violations. R. 65 [35-39]. The controlled substances 
ultimately discovered in Mr. Beach's possession was obtained solely because of the 
officers' illegal questioning which exceeded the scope of the stop. R. 65 [39-41]. 
The trial court denied the Motion to Suppress. R. 65 [60-62]. Subsequently, Mr. 
Beach pled guilty to the Class A Misdemeanor of Attempted Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with the condition that he could appeal the trial court's denial of the Motion to 
Suppress evidence. R. 31-37. He was sentenced on 8 May 2001. R. 43-45. He filed a 
timely Notice of Appeal. R. 46-47. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On 8 September 2000, Officer Aaron Leavitt ["Officer Leavitt"] was on patrol 
with Officer Josh Sharman ["Officer Sharman"] and Sergeant Rusty Issacson ["Sergeant 
4 
Issacson"] in an unmarked patrol car. R. 65 [6-7]. As they drove east along Sumonie 
Avenue, Officer Leavitt noticed a vehicle parked at the side of the road. R. 65 [7]. 
Sumonie Avenue is a narrow street, and the vehicle was blocking most of the westbound 
lane. Id. Mr. Beach was leaning into the passenger-side window speaking with the 
passenger. R. 65 [9]. As the officers approached, Officer Leavitt saw Mr. Beach make a 
"hand-to-hand exchange" with the passenger. Id. Officer Leavitt, who was driving, had to 
slow to five miles per hour to squeeze past the parked vehicle. R. 65 [10]. He met Mr. 
Beach's gaze as the cars passed. R. 65 [12]. Based on this, Officer Leavitt testified that he 
believed Mr. Beach was engaged in a drug transaction. R. 65 [11]. 
After passing, Officer Leavitt turned, pulled in behind the parked vehicle, and 
activated the police car's emergency lights. R. 65 [12]. Mr. Beach started walking away. 
Id. Officer Leavitt exited the police car and called out to Mr. Beach. R. 65 [13]. Officer 
Leavitt identified himself as a police officer and asked Mr. Beach to return and answer 
some questions. Id. In the meantime, Officer Sharman and Sergeant Issacson approached 
the two people in the parked car and began talking to them. R. 65 [19]. 
Officer Leavitt asked Mr. Beach to identify himself and explain what he was 
doing in the area. R, 65 [13, 20]. Mr. Beach said that he did not have a driver's license 
and gave the Officer a Utah identification card. R. 65 [25]. He also explained that he is in 
the business of buying old vehicles from salvage yards, refurbishing them, and selling 
them for profit. R. 65 [14]. He was selling a car to the people he had been talking to and 
had exchanged some paperwork with them. Id. The people in the car confirmed that Mr. 
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Beach was selling them the car.3 
Officer Leavitt asked Mr. Beach whether he had any weapons, drugs, or needles. 
R. 65 [21]. Mr. Beach replied that he did not. IdL Officer Leavitt asked Mr. Beach if he 
would submit to a search. R. 65 [22]. Mr. Beach reached into his pockets and removed 
some of the contents, including a flyer, a yellow sales slip from an auto yard, and 
paperwork for the vehicle that he had been selling. R. 65 [22-23]. Meanwhile, Officer 
Sharman held Mr. Beach's state identification card and ran a check to determine the 
status of his driver's license and whether he had any outstanding warrants. R. 65 [26, 61]. 
The officers discovered that Mr. Beach's driver's license had been suspended.4 
Officer Leavitt again asked Mr. Beach if he would submit to a search of his 
person. R. 65 [24-25]. Mr. Beach replied, "Well, did I do anything wrong?" R. 65[27]. 
Officer Leavitt asked Mr. Beach why he was nervous. Id. Mr. Beach produced an adult 
magazine, showed it to Officer Leavitt, and indicated that he was nervous because of the 
magazine. Id. Officer Leavitt looked at the magazine, returned it to Mr. Beach, and said 
he could have it. R. 65 [27-28]. About this time, Mr. Beach's state identification card was 
returned to him. R. 65 [28]. 
Officer Leavitt asked Mr. Beach a third time whether he would submit to a search 
3
 R. 65 [20]. Officer Sharman and Sergeant Issacson told Officer Leavitt after Mr. 
Beach's arrest that the people confirmed they were buying a car from Mr. Beach. Id. They said 
that they had planned to test drive the car that day. Id. 
4
 R. 65 [26]. Mr. Beach also indicated that he had driven the car over to the buyer's 
home. The police did not issue him a citation for driving on a suspended license. IcL 
6 
of his person for drugs, needles, knives, weapons, or any other contraband. R. 65 [28]. He 
responded, "Go ahead." IcL Officer Leavitt said, "You don't have to let us if you don't 
want to we won't." Id. Mr. Beach responded, "I'm not going to lie to you guys, I have a 
little." R. 65 [30-31]. Mr. Beach reached into his pocket and pulled out a baggie that 
contained methamphetamine. R. 65 [31]. Then he consented to a search. R. 65 [14-15]. 
The officers searched him and found another baggie of methamphetamine. R. 65 [15]. At 
that point, the officers placed him under arrest. R. 65 [15]. 
Mr. Beach had been detained and questioned by the police for a total of twenty-
two minutes prior to his arrest. R. 65 [16]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Evidence of controlled substances found in Mr. Beach's possession should have 
been suppressed by the trial court because they are the fruit of an unconstitutional search 
and seizure. The police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Mr. Beach.5 
Mr. Beach was simply leaning into the passenger side window of a car speaking with the 
passenger. R. 65 [9]. He also exchanged something with the passenger. Id. However, he 
was not in front of a drug house, did not seem concerned with the officers' presence, and 
the police did not have information that he was involved in criminal activity. R. 65 [17-
18]. In short, there was nothing to distinguish Mr. Beach's behavior from that of any 
5See State v. Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("a 'brief investigatory stop 
of an individual by police officers is permissible when the officers have a reasonable suspicion, 
based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.'") (citation omitted). 
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other law-abiding citizen.6 
Even if the police did have reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Beach, the detainment 
should have ended as soon as the police discovered that Mr. Beach was not involved in a 
drug transaction.7 Immediately after Officer Leavitt began questioning him, Mr. Beach 
explained that he was selling the car to the people inside. R. 65 [14]. He also produced a 
bill of sale for the car. R. 65 [22]. Those in the car confirmed that Mr. Beach was selling 
them the car. R. 65 [60]. At that point, the police were legally obligated to release Mr. 
Beach because the purpose of the stop had been effectuated. 
Instead, the police persisted in questioning Mr. Beach for a total of twenty-two 
minutes. R. 65 [16]. They asked him three times for his consent to a search in spite of his 
obvious reluctance to consent. R. 65 [19-29]. They told him they wanted to search him to 
"find out" what he was doing wrong. R. 65 [25]. It was apparent that the officers 
intended to detain him until they were satisfied that he did not possess any controlled 
substances. The prosecutor had an increased burden of proof in this case because of the 
officers' prior illegal stop and detainment. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 
1990). The prosecutor failed to meet this burden to prove that Mr. Beach's consent was 
6
 See Salt Lake Citv v. Rav. 2000 UT App 55,119, 998 P.2d 274 ("the facts known to 
the officers regarding Ray were at least as consistent with lawful behavior as with the 
commission of a crime"). 
7
 See State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, U 11, 17 P.3d 1135 cert, granted State v. 
Hansen, 26 P.3d 235 (Utah 2001) ("Both 'the length and scope of the detention must be 'strictly 
tied to and jusified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible."') (citations 
omitted). 
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voluntary. Therefore, evidence of controlled substances should have been suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE THERE WAS NO REASONABLE. ARTICULABLE 
SUSPICION TO STOP MR, BEACH AND DETAIN HIM FOR TWENTY-
TWO MINUTES. EVIDENCE OF DRUGS SUBSEQUENTLY 
DISCOVERED ON HIS PERSON SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED 
Evidence of controlled substances found in Mr. Beach's possession is the fruit of 
an unconstitutional seizure and its admission makes the court a party to a lawless 
invasion of individual constitutional rights. The police were not justified in stopping Mr. 
Beach because they did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was involved 
in criminal activity. He was merely leaning into the passenger window of a car 
exchanging paperwork for the sale of the car with the passenger. R. 65 [9, 14]. Even if 
this gave rise to reasonable suspicion, the police were legally required to release him 
once he explained that he was selling the car and showed them the bill of sale. This is 
particularly so in light of the buyers' corroboration of Mr. Beach's explanation. R. 65 
[20]. Instead of releasing him, however, the police persisted in questioning him and 
retained his state identification card to run a warrants and criminal history check. R. 65 
[20-29, 61]. They also persisted in requesting his consent to a search of his person. Id. In 
these circumstances, the ultimate discovery of controlled substances was the fruit of an 
illegal seizure and should have been suppressed. 
9 
A. Mr, Beach was Seized for Fourth Amendment Purposes Because the 
Police Approached with Emergency Lights Flashing, Called for his Return, 
and Retained his Identification Card While Running a Warrants Check 
A trial court's determination of whether a person has been seized for Fourth 
Amendment purposes is best understood in the context of the three possible levels of 
police intrusion. Those three levels are as follows: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at any [] time and pose questions so 
long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a 
person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable 
cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being committed. 
State v. Contrel. 886 P.2d 107, 108 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). A seizure of a person, or level 
two intrusion, occurs "[w]hen a reasonable person, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of cooperation with the officer's investigation, 
but because he believes he is not free to leave . . . . " State v. Trujillo. 739 P.2d 85, 87 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). In other words, a person is seized once a police officer "'by means 
of physical force or show of authority has in some way restrained the liberty of a person." 
Salt Lake Citv v. Rav. 2000 Utah Ct. App. 55, Tf 11, 998 P.2d 274 (quoting State v. Bean. 
869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). 
In this case, Mr. Beach was seized. As he walked down the side of the street an 
unmarked car containing three police officers pulled over and emergency lights began 
flashing. R. 65 [6, 12]. Officer Leavitt emerged from the car and called out to Mr. Beach, 
identifying himself as a police officer and asking him to return and answer some 
10 
questions. R. 65 [19]. After taking Mr. Beach's identification, Officer Leavitt did not 
simply view the information and return the card. He retained the card while Officer 
Sharman ran a warrants and driver's license check on Mr. Beach. R. 65 [25-28]. In these 
circumstances, a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave. 
This Court's recent decision in Salt Lake City v. Ray is dispositive. In that case, 
this Court held that a defendant was seized when she was confronted in front of a 
convenience store by two uniformed police officers who wore badges and guns. Ray, 
2000 Utah Ct. App. 55, f 14. The officers asked for her identification and, rather than 
viewing the information and returning the card, one of the officers retained her card for 
approximately five minutes while he performed a warrants check. The other officer 
continued questioning her. Id. Citing several dispositive cases,8 this Court found that 
"[generally, when a person's identification or other important papers are taken by a law 
enforcement officer, a reasonable person would not feel free to leave." Id Thus, the 
defendant in Ray was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes after her identification card 
This Court cited the following supporting cases: Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491, 493 
(1983) (defendant seized at an airport when two plainclothes detectives, after retaining his 
identification and airline ticket, asked him to accompany them to a private room where they 
eventually made a consensual search of his belongings); and United States v. Chan-Jimenez, 125 
F.3d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1997) (defendant seized when an officer approached him at the side of 
the road, asked for his driver's license and registration, and without returning the documents 
asked to look in the bed of defendant's truck). 
This Court also cited the following supporting cases: United States v. Lambert. 46 F.3d 
1064, 1068 (10th Cir. 1995); Reynolds v. Maryland. 746 A.2d 422 (1999); State v. Holmes. 569 
N.W.2d 181, 185 (Minn. 1997); State v. Godina-Luna. 826 P.2d 652, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
and State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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was retained. IdL at 280. 
In this case, the police made a level two seizure because they activated their 
emergency lights and called for Mr. Beach's return. Then they held his identification 
cards while running a warrants and criminal history check. Mr. Beach was obliged to 
stay, and was thus seized for Fourth Amendment purposes. 
B. The Seizure of Mr. Beach was Illegal at its Inception Because It was Based 
Upon Nothing More than a Police Officer's Hunch that he Could Unearth 
Some Illegal Activity 
A police officer may not seize a person on the basis of a hunch that the person is 
involved in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). In determining 
whether a level two seizure is justified, it must be determined whether the public interest 
in crime prevention outweighs the individual right to personal security and privacy. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 23; State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 90 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). To justify 
a level two seizure, a police officer must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a 
person is engaged in criminal activity. State v. Kohl 2000 UT 35, ^  11, 999 P.2d 7. Only 
then will the balance between the public interest in crime prevention and the personal 
security of individuals tilt in favor of crime prevention to allow for personal seizure. As 
the United States Supreme Court indicated in the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio: 
[a]nything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed 
rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result 
this Court has consistently refused to sanction And simple "'good faith 
on the part of the arresting officer is not enough.'... If subjective good 
faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would 
12 
evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects,' only in the discretion of the police." 
Terry. 392 U.S. at 22 (citations omitted). 
The constitutional requirement of reasonable suspicion is codified in Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-7-15. Section 77-7-15 states: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1999). Thus, under the statute, "a 'brief investigatory stop of 
an individual by police officers is permissible when the officers 'have a reasonable 
suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity."" 
Trujillo. 739 P.2d at 88 (citations omitted). 
In this case, the trial court made pertinent findings with regard to the 
circumstances of Mr. Beach's seizure. The court's findings were as follows: 
[T]he officer made a stop in a known drug region. The officer's specific 
assignment is pursuit and interdiction with drugs. There was a known drug 
house in the neighborhood that they had been observing. The officer 
observed what he though was a hand-to-hand exchange which indeed 
prove[d] to be truthful. There was a hand-to-hand exchange. He thought it 
was narcotics, the explanation given was that it was in relation to a 
transaction for a sale of a vehicle. The officer learned only of the purchase 
of the vehicle by Beach and did not ever have a problem confirming 
information as to the sale of the vehicle by Beach to the person sitting in 
the car. 
He pulled over immediately, activated his lights, gave his identification 
and asked Beach to come up and talk to him. And he did. Beach seemed 
anxious, he seemed nervous. He was rocking from side to side.... 
13 
R. 65 [60]. The trial court omitted to mention that Officer Leavitt testified Mr. Beach was 
not in front of the suspected drug house. R. 65 [17]. Also, the police had not received any 
information about Mr. Beach or the vehicle he was selling. Id. Mr. Beach and the 
individuals in the car continued their transaction and were unconcerned as the police 
drove slowly by. R. 65 [18]. Finally, Mr. Beach readily met Officer Leavitt's gaze when 
he tried to make eye contact. R. 65 [12]. 
The trial court also omitted to make a legal conclusion based upon its findings. R. 
65 [60-62]. Instead, the court simply moved past the issue of whether there was 
reasonable suspicion and found that Mr. Beach had voluntarily consented to the search of 
his person. R. 65 [61]. 
Applying the law correctly, the trial court should have found that there was not a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying the seizure of Mr. Beach. Reasonable 
suspicion must be based upon objective facts, and not upon intuition or "inarticulate 
hunches." Terry. 392 U.S. at 22. Although "a trained law enforcement officer may be 
able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly 
innocent to the untrained observer," Trujillo. 739 P.2d at 88, "specific and articulable 
facts" must nevertheless support the seizure. Ray, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 55, ]f 18. These 
facts must be drawn from the totality of circumstances facing the officers at the time of 
the seizure. Id. 
There are several cases directly on point. In State v. Trujillo this Court found that 
the seizure of a man walking down State Street at 3:30 a.m. with two friends was not 
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reasonable because nothing distinguished the man's activity from that of any other 
pedestrian in the area. Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 90. The defendant and his friends had been 
peering into business windows and at one point stared at a poster located outside an adult 
theater. Id. at 86. The defendant carried a nylon knapsack and shifted "this knapsack from 
his side to his front in what [the observing police officer] considered an effort to conceal 
it." Id However, the officer "did not see the trio violate any traffic ordinances or engage 
in any criminal behavior." IcL 
The officer pulled over, got out, and walked towards the trio. The defendant 
placed his knapsack next to a garbage can "in what [the police officer] regarded as an 
effort to 'stash it.'" Id, Nobody attempted to avoid the officer. Id. However, all three 
appeared nervous. Id. The officer asked them for identification and an explanation of 
their activities. Id Only one of the trio produced identification and the defendant 
explained that they were on their way to his cousin's house. Id. A backup officer soon 
arrived. Id. At that point, the defendant was instructed to place his hands on the patrol car 
and spread his feet. Id The officer patted him down and discovered an 8" to 10" knife 
strapped to his chest. Id The defendant was arrested for possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person. Id 
The officer testified that his decision to stop and detain the defendant was based 
upon the following: "(1) it was a high-crime area; (2) the lateness of the hour; (3) the 
apparent nervous conduct of the trio; and, (4) the 'suspicious' nylon knapsack" the 
defendant carried. Id. 
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This Court found that "[w]hile [the officer] testified that the situation looked 
suspicious, he was unable to point to specific objective facts to support his 'hunch.'" Id. 
at 90. Specifically, this Court indicated that nervous behavior by people approached by 
police officers "is consistent with innocent as well as with criminal behavior." Id. at 89. 
Further, there was no evidence that the defendant was "casing" the businesses or that 
there was anything unusual about walking down State Street at a late hour. Id Finally, 
there was no distinguishable reason for the officer's concern regarding the defendant's 
knapsack. Id. Thus, the officer was not justified in stopping and detaining the defendant, 
and the ultimate discovery of the knife was unconstitutional and should have been 
suppressed at trial. Id 
In another case, Salt Lake City v. Ray, a police officer arrived at a 24-hour 
convenience store to investigate a "suspicious female." Ray, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 55, ^ f 3. 
He found a woman standing outside near the pay phone and the store clerk confirmed 
that this woman was the "problem person." Id. Wearing full uniform, he approached the 
woman and began questioning her. She told the officer that she had made a purchase at 
the store earlier, and was waiting for a ride to work. Id. at f 4. She said she had been 
waiting thirty minutes, but the store clerk indicated that she had been there for two hours. 
Id. Another officer arrived and also began questioning the woman. Id The woman 
"appeared nervous, although not agitated, and she talked fast and repeatedly shifted her 
weight from one foot to the other." Id at ^ f 5. The officer took the woman's state 
identification card and ran a warrants check on her. Id Meanwhile, the officer who had 
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originally approached the woman asked her about the contents of her bag. IdL Ultimately, 
drug paraphernalia was discovered in her bag. Id. at % 6. 
In reversing the woman's conviction, this Court held that the police did not have 
reasonable suspicion to stop and detain her. Id at % 19. This Court indicated that "x[i]n 
determining whether this objective standard has been met, the focus necessarily centers 
upon the facts known to the officer immediately before the stop.'" IdL at H 18. (quoting 
State v. Friesen. 1999 UT App 262, ^  12, 988 P.2d 7). Because the facts known to the 
officers "were at least as consistent with lawful behavior as with the commission of a 
crime," reasonable suspicion did not support the seizure.9 Further, the officers had no 
knowledge that the woman had committed or was about to commit a crime. Id. Thus, 
reasonable suspicion did not support the seizure of the woman. Id. at f 20. 
Like the defendants in Trujillo and Ray, Mr. Beach's behavior was at least as 
consistent with lawful behavior as with criminal activity.10 Mr. Beach was merely leaning 
9
 Id at f 19. The facts known to the officers were that: 
(1) Boehner had reported - and the officers received a dispatch for - a 'suspicious 
female,' regarding Ray; (2) Ray was standing outside the store near a pay phone; 
(3) Ray had made an earlier purchase in the store; (4) an empty container near 
Ray confirmed she had made a purchase; (5) Ray was waiting for a ride to work 
which had not materialized; (6) although Ray stated at first she had been waiting 
for thirty minutes, Boehner said she had been there for two house; (7) while being 
questioned, Ray appeared nervous, talked fast, and shifted her weight from one 
foot to the other. 
Id at If 19 n. 8. 
10
 See Ray, 2000 UT App 55, Tf 19 ("the facts known to the officers regarding Ray were at 
least as consistent with lawful behavior as with the commission of a crime"); Trujillo. 739 P.2d 
at 90 (reasonable suspicion not found because there was "nothing to distinguish Trujillo's 
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into the passenger side window of a parked car speaking with the passenger. R. 65 [9]. 
He was doing so in broad daylight, R. 65 [16], and even though there was a suspected 
drug house in the neighborhood, Mr. Beach was not near the house. R. 65 [17]. This is 
common behavior which many people engage in regularly. 
The "hand-to-hand exchange" that Mr. Beach engaged in with the passenger 
proved to be an exchange of paperwork for the sale of the car, R. 65 [9, 18], and this was 
made known to the police within a few minutes of the stop. R. 65 [20]. The officer could 
not testify that there was anything significant or unusual about the exchange which 
caused him to believe it was a drug transaction. R. 65 [18]. The people involved did not 
seem concerned as the officers passed. R. 65 [18]. Nor did Mr. Beach avoid eye contact 
with Officer Leavitt. R. 65 [18]. If anything, this should have reassured the officers that 
illegal activity was not taking place. 
Officer Leavitt testified that, as he questioned Mr. Beach, Mr. Beach became 
anxious and nervous. However, it has been soundly recognized that this is the reaction of 
many people when questioned by the police, and this does not constitute a basis for 
reasonable suspicion. Ray, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 55, ^  19; State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 
541 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 436 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Truiillo, 739 P.2d at 89. 
In essence, there was nothing to distinguish Mr. Beach's behavior from that of any 
other person. Every day many people all over the city speak with others parked at street 
activity from any other pedestrian in the area"). 
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curbs, and frequently they exchange items or paperwork with each other. This activity 
does not provide a basis for the police to indulge in a level two seizure and go on a 
fishing expedition for contraband. 
On the basis of the above, the trial court should have concluded that reasonable 
suspicion did not support the seizure of Mr. Beach. Thus, the ultimate discovery of the 
drugs should have been suppressed. Because it was not, Mr. Beach's conviction should 
be reversed and this case should be remanded. 
C. The Questioning of Mr, Beach Went Beyond the Scope of the Stop 
Because the Police Continued to Detain and Question Him After he Gave a 
Legitimate Explanation of his Activities that was Corroborated by 
Paperwork and Two Witnesses 
Even if reasonable suspicion supported the initial seizure of Mr. Beach, Mr. Beach 
is entitled to a reversal of his conviction because the police failed to release Mr. Beach 
after receiving a truthful, lawful explanation of his activities. Immediately after being 
asked to explain his activities, Mr. Beach said that he is in the business of refurbishing 
old cars for resale, and that he was in the process of selling the car. R. 65 [14]. He 
produced a bill of sale as proof of the transaction, R. 65 [22], and Officer Leavitt could 
have confirmed Mr. Beach's story with the individuals in the car at any time. R. 65 [60]. 
Because the police received a corroborated, lawful explanation, and because there was no 
indication of illegal activity, the police were legally obliged to release Mr. Beach.11 
11
 See State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, f 11, 17 P.3d 1135 ("Both 'the length and 
scope of the detention must be 'strictly tied to and justified by5 the circumstances which 
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However, they persisted in questioning him for a total of twenty-two minutes, R. 65 [16], 
and asked him three times for consent to a search of his person. R. 65 [22-29]. They were 
not satisfied when he emptied his pockets and showed them the contents. Id When he 
asked whether he had done anything wrong, they told him "[w]e're gonna find that out . . 
. ." R. 65 [25]. Under these circumstances, Mr. Beach was unreasonably detained beyond 
the legitimate scope of the stop. 
Because every person has a Fourth Amendment right to the "'possession and 
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interferences of others,'" Terry v. 
Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968), the seizure of a person may be justified only "by clear and 
unquestionable authority of law." Id. In other words, the need to seize must be balanced 
against the invasion which the seizure entails. Id at 21. The balance does not tilt in favor 
of seizure unless the seizure is supported at its inception by reasonable suspicion. State v. 
Trujillo. 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Further, the "detention 'must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop '" 
State v. ContreL 886 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Specifically, "'[t]he length and 
scope of the detention must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which 
rendered its initiation permissible.'" Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, If 11. 
Recently, in State v. Hansen, this Court found that a police officer exceeded the 
rendered its initiation permissible.'") (citations omitted); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 
(Utah 1994) ("If reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity does arise, the scope of 
the stop is still limited. The officers must 'diligently [pursue] a means of investigation that [is] 
likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it [is] necessary to detain 
the defendant.") 
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permissible scope of a traffic stop when, after attending to the matter of the traffic 
violation, he returned the driver's license and registration, but failed to inform the driver 
that he was free to leave. Id at ^  13-14. The officer also remained parked behind the car 
with emergency lights flashing, and asked the driver the investigatory question of 
whether he had drugs, alcohol, or weapons in the car. Id. at % 14-15. Further, the officer 
did not inform the driver how he had resolved the issue of the traffic violation before he 
asked an investigatory question not related to the violation. Id at ^ f 15. In these 
circumstances, this Court held that the driver "was illegally detained when Officer 
Huntington asked him questions that were not reasonably related in scope to the traffic 
violation which justified the initial seizure." Id. at If 16. 
In another case, State v. Robinson, this Court found that a police officer exceeded 
the permissible scope of a stop when he pulled the defendant over after the defendant 
abruptly swerved into the officer's lane. Robinson. 797 P.2d at 433. After the defendant 
gave the officer his California driver's license and explained that he had borrowed the 
van from his employer, the officer wrote the defendant a warning for abruptly crossing 
traffic lanes. Id Another officer arrived on the scene and the two officers observed a 
homemade bed, two gym bags, and a fishing pole in the back of the van. Id They asked 
the defendant and his companion if they were carrying weapons, large amounts of 
money, or narcotics. Id. at 434. Both the defendant and his companion replied in the 
negative. Id. 
Then the officers asked for consent to search the van. Id. Consent was given. Id 
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They searched the van and found an under-bed compartment. Id. In the compartment they 
discovered fresh wood shavings and carpet fibers. Id. The driver protested when he was 
asked for permission to remove some screws so that the officers could search under the 
boards. Li One of the officers stated that he would normally impound the van as a 
possible stolen vehicle. Id. Then he said, "[i]f there's nothing under that [bed] like you 
say, if we was [sic] to look under there, I would see what's under there and you could be 
on your way." Id. Another officer said, "[s]ince you won't let us take the plywood panel 
off the van to look under the bed, would it be all right if we let a dog go through the 
vehicle?" Id Eventually, permission was given to let a dog search. A police dog arrived 
and located eight duffel bags of marijuana in the space under the bed's platform. IdL 
This Court found that the legal basis for the stop ended after the matter of the lane 
change was resolved. Id. 437. However, the officers persisted in questioning the driver 
and his companion for twenty minutes and repeatedly requested permission to search the 
vehicle. Id. at 437-38. This Court found that "it was apparent that the defendants would 
be kept in that custodial environment until the troopers satisfied their curiosity about the 
contents of the van, particularly the area under the bed." IdL at 438. Thus, the ultimate 
discovery of the marijuana was unlawful and should have been suppressed at trial. Id 
In light of this precedent, Mr. Beach's conviction should be reversed. The seizure 
of Mr. Beach was not supported by reasonable suspicion in the first place.12 However, 
12
 See Subsection I, B of this brief (arguing that the police did not have reasonable 
suspicion to stop Mr. Beach). 
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even if it was, the seizure should have ended when the purpose of the stop was 
effectuated.13 Officer Leavitt testified that the purpose of the stop was to determine 
whether Mr. Beach was involved in a drug transaction when he made a "hand-to-hand 
exchange" with the passenger of the car. R. 65 [9-11]. That suspicion proved to be 
unfounded. Mr. Beach explained that he was selling the car and produced proof of sale, 
and the buyers stated that they were buying the car. R. 65 [60]. At that point, the officers 
were legally obliged to release Mr. Beach. 
However, the officers illegally detained Mr. Beach beyond the scope of the stop. 
They held his state identification card to run a warrants check, R. 65 [26] and asked him 
for consent to a personal search three times. R. 65 [28]. All three officers remained 
present, R. 65 [28], the questioning did not cease, R. 65 [22-29], and Mr. Beach was 
never told that he could leave. Id. In these circumstances, Mr. Beach reasonably believed 
he would not be allowed to leave until the police satisfied themselves about whether he 
possessed any controlled substances. Thus, the detainment went beyond the permissible 
scope of the stop.14 
See Contrel 886 P.2d at 109 (the seizure must "last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop ") 
14
 See Hansen. 2000 UT App 353, f^ 12 ("For the seizure to end, it must be clear to the 
seized person, either from the words of an officer or from the clear import of the circumstances, 
that the person is at liberty to go about his or her business.") (quoting State v. Higgins. 884 P.2d 
1242, 1244 (Utah 1994)). 
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II, THE STATE FAILED TO SHOW THAT MR. BEACH'S CONSENT TO 
A SEARCH OF HIS PERSON WAS VOLUNTARY IN LIGHT OF THE 
COERCIVE CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE PRIOR ILLEGAL STOP AND 
DETAINMENT 
Mr. Beach's consent to the personal search was not voluntary. In spite of his 
obvious reluctance to submit to a search,15 Officer Leavitt asked him three times to 
consent to one, R. 65 [19-29], and questioned him for a total of twenty-two minutes. R. 
65 [16]. The officers informed him that they wanted to search him to "find out" what he 
was doing wrong. R. 65 [25]. They also retained his identification card to run a warrants 
check. R. 65 [24-28]. They checked the status of his driver's license even though he had 
already informed them that he did not have one. R. 65 [26]. It was apparent that the 
police intended to detain him until they had satisfied themselves about whether he had 
any contraband in his possession. These circumstances are coercive. Also, the police 
officers' lack of reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Beach in the first place, or detain him 
after he explained his activities, increased the prosecutor's burden of proof. The 
prosecutor failed to meet this burden, and Mr. Beach's consent cannot be considered 
voluntary. 
15
 After being asked to consent to a search, Mr. Beach did not answer, but began pulling 
items out of his pockets to show to the officer. R. 65 [22-23]. The items included a yellow sales 
slip, a flyer, and money. R. 65 [22-24]. Mr. Beach was asked to submit to a search a second time, 
and he asked whether he had done anything wrong. R. 65 [24-25]. Officer Leavitt responded 
"[w]e're gonna find that out " R. 65 [25]. At that time Officer Sharman was running checks 
on Mr. Beach's identification card. Mr. Beach showed Officer Leavitt an adult magazine, and 
Officer Leavitt returned the magazine to him. R. 65 [27-28]. Officer Sharman joined Officer 
Leavitt as he questioned Mr. Beach, and then Mr. Beach was asked a third time to submit to a 
search. R. 65 [28]. Mr. Beach eventually submitted. Id 
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"A warrantless search is a per se Fourth Amendment violation unless the State can 
establish one of the 'few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'... 
One of the clearly established exceptions is a consent." State v. Hansen. 2000 UT App 
353, f 17, 17 P.3d 1135. "However, evidence from a consent search can only be admitted 
if the State establishes that consent was voluntary, and that the search did not exceed the 
scope of that consent." State v. Castner. 825 P.2d 699, 703 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Consent which is not voluntarily given is invalid. State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684, 687 
(Utah 1990). 
Significantly, "[w]hen the prosecution attempts to prove voluntary consent after an 
illegal police action (e.g., unlawful arrest or stop), the prosecution 'has a much heavier 
burden to satisfy than when proving consent to search' which does not follow police 
misconduct." Id. at 687-88 (quoting United States v. Melendez-Gonzalez. 727 F.2d 407, 
414 (5th Cir. 1984)). The State must show that the consent was both voluntary in fact, and 
obtained without police exploitation of the prior illegality. State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 
431,437 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Voluntary consent is that which is, in fact, voluntarily 
given, and not the result of "duress or coercion, express or implied." Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973). In determining whether the evidence was 
obtained without police exploitation of the prior illegality, it must be determined whether 
the evidence was obtained "by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the 
primary taint." Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471,487-88 (1963). In other words, 
it must be shown that the police did not "use the fruits of the primary illegality to coerce 
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[the] defendant into granting his consent." United States v. Carson. 793 F.2d 1141, 1148 
(10th Cir. 1986). 
It is the State's burden to prove that Mr. Beach voluntarily gave his consent to the 
search, and the State failed to prove this. Mr. Beach's consent was coerced. The presence 
of three officers, who did not release him after receiving a corroborated explanation of 
his activities, the repeated requests for consent to search in spite of Mr. Beach's obvious 
reluctance, and the retention of Mr. Beach's identification, created coercive 
circumstances. 
Additionally, the police used the fruits of their prior illegal stop and detainment to 
coerce Mr. Beach into granting his consent to the search.16 The police stopped Mr. Beach 
without reasonable suspicion that he was involved in criminal activity. They merely had a 
hunch that Mr. Beach was conducting a drug transaction with the people in the car. After 
stopping him, they learned that a drug transaction was not taking place. Rather than 
releasing him, however, they persisted in questioning him and in requesting his consent 
to a search. This ultimately led to Mr. Beach's production of drugs, and the discovery of 
drugs on his person. The consent and discovery was not sufficiently attenuated from the 
prior illegal seizure. The same officer questioned him continually throughout the episode, 
there was no intervening event, and Mr. Beach's consent was obtained solely through 
16
 See Id ('"In the context of voluntary consent,' the court held that 'exploitation of the 
primary illegality' meant that the police use the fruits of the primary illegality to coerce [the] 
defendant into granting his consent.") (citation omitted). 
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exploitation of the prior illegal stop and detainment. 
Mr. Beach's eventual consent to the search is not valid, and the trial court should 
have suppressed evidence of the controlled substances found. Instead, the trial court 
made a cursory summary of Officer Leavitt's testimony. R. 65 [60-61]. Then the court 
concluded that Mr. Beach's consent was voluntarily given. R. 65 [61]. 
The trial court's summary of Officer Leavitt's testimony is not a comprehensive 
body of findings of fact. The trial court did not chronicle the sequence of events, did not 
mention the second request to search, did not discuss the conversation between Mr. 
Beach and the officers, did not mention the length of time that Mr. Beach was 
questioned, and could not remember exactly what evidence was found in the search.18 
Officer Leavitt testified that after Mr. Beach finally gave consent to the search, he was 
informed that he was not required to give consent. R. 65 [28]. However, this did not serve to 
attenuate the consent from the prior illegal stop and detainment. The police obtained Mr. 
Beach's consent solely because of they illegally stopped him in the first place. They suspected a 
drug transaction and persisted in questioning Mr. Beach even after it was shown that there was 
no drug transaction. They asked his consent three times in spite of his reluctance to grant it, and 
the overall circumstances were coercive. Thus, Officer's Leavitt's statement did not serve to 
attenuate the consent from the prior illegal stop and detainment. 
18
 The trial court's summary of Officer Leavitt's testimony was as follows: 
The officer asked if he could search. The officer asked several questions. Beach 
was pulling things out of his pocket. Some of which were related to the purchase 
of the vehicle, not the sale of the vehicle, and Beach indicated that he had 
committed at least two motor vehicle offenses, one that he driven the car over to 
the location on a suspended license and two, that he hadn't acknowledged that he 
didn't have a suspended license that this officer with other officers checked out to 
see if there were any NCIC hits on the vehicle and on Beach's ID. Those were 
confirmed to be negative. 
Then the officer asked him if he could search further to see if he had any meth or 
contraband on him and Beach said, "I have a little." That was the testimony the 
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The court concluded, "I don't see anything in this stop that causes me to conclude that 
the results of information of being sought were anything but voluntary." R. 65 [61]. 
This conclusion is properly reviewed for correctness. Hansen. 2000 UT App 353, 
f 7. The conclusion is incorrect because it fails to take into account the coerciveness of 
repetitive requests for consent to search and the implications in the conversation between 
Mr. Beach and the police that Mr. Beach would be held until the police were satisfied 
that he did not possess contraband.19 The conclusion also fails to take into account the 
State's increased burden of proof due to the prior illegal stop and detainment. The 
conclusion is not soundly based and is incorrect. Thus, Mr. Beach's conviction should be 
reversed and this case should be remanded. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the above, Mr. Beach's conviction should be reversed and this case 
should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to suppress evidence of controlled 
officer quoted. Beach than pulled out one baggy and Beach asked if he could 
search for, excuse me, Leavitt asked if he could search Beach further and Beach 
said go ahead. The officer then searched and found, as I recall, two other baggies. 
So I think there wer two baggies total, there were two plus the one pulled out for a 
total of three. I don't recall that specific detail. 
R. 65 [60-61]. 
19
 See R. 65 [25] (Officer Leavitt testified he told Mr. Beach "[w]e're gonna find out" 
whether Mr. Beach had done anything wrong "apart from what he already previously admitted 
to, driving on a suspended licens[e], driving a vehicle that didn't have any registration or any 
registration stickers, no plates, besides that); R. 65 [21-22, 24, 28] (Officer Leavitt testified he 
told Mr. Beach several times the purpose of searching would be to discover drugs, needles, 
knives, weapons, or other contraband.) 
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substances found in Mr. Beach's possession. 
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ADDENDUM A 
D 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
,!fiW,l|w com 
" * * Judicial DiQ"ric" 
MAY 0 8 2001 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
KENNETH BEACH, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Pre-Trial Services 
MINUTES Do^TcST 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 001915802 MO 
Judge: DAVID S YOUNG 
Date: May 4, 2001 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS 
DATE 
PRESENT 
Clerk: taunah 
Prosecutor: SHEFFIELD, KELLY R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STERLING, OTIS 
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 26, 1965 
Video 
Tape Number: 2001-18 Tape Count: 9:15 
CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) -
Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/09/2001 {Guilty Plea} 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED ILLEGAL POSS/USE 
OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) The total time suspended for 
this charge is 245 day(s). 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Credit is granted for 43 day(s) previously served. 
BEACH, KENNETH J D 
Case No: 001915802 
Date: May 04, 2001 
SENTENCE JAIL RELEASE TIME NOTE 
Defendant is to serve jail time until 5-31-01, then is to be 
released from custody on that date. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $2800.00 
Suspended: $2500.00 
Surcharge: $255.00 
Due: $555.00 
Total Fine: $2800.00 
Total Suspended: $2500.00 
Total Surcharge: $255.00 
Total Principal Due: $555.00 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: LDA 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 12 0 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 555.00 where the surcharge has been 
added to the fine. Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
Case No: 001915802 
Date: May 04, 2001 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Participate in and complete any educational; and/or vocational 
training as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Violate no laws. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Participate in mental health counseling. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Complete GED or high school equivalent 
Maintain full time employment 
Dated this & day of flA^ 
